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Abstract—In this paper, we address a pursuit-evasion game
involving multiple players by utilizing tools and techniques from
reinforcement learning and matrix game theory. In particular, we
consider the problem of steering an evader to a goal destination
while avoiding capture by multiple pursuers, which is a high-
dimensional and computationally intractable problem in general.
In our proposed approach, we first formulate the multi-agent
pursuit-evasion game as a sequence of discrete matrix games.
Next, in order to simplify the solution process, we transform the
high-dimensional state space into a low-dimensional manifold and
the continuous action space into a feature-based space, which
is a discrete abstraction of the original space. Based on these
transformed state and action spaces, we subsequently employ
min-max Q-learning, to generate the entries of the payoff matrix
of the game, and subsequently obtain the optimal action for
the evader at each stage. Finally, we present extensive numerical
simulations to evaluate the performance of the proposed learning-
based evading strategy in terms of the evader’s ability to reach
the desired target location without being captured, as well as
computational efficiency.
Index Terms—Min-max Q-learning, pursuit-evasion games,
matrix games.
I. INTRODUCTION
Interaction between multiple agents is present in nature (e.g.
predation) as well as human-built constructs (such as markets,
traffic situations, and defense). In order to better understand
and predict the potential outcomes of such interactions among
multiple agents, each with their own aims, preferences and
resources, we have to understand their underlying decision-
making mechanisms. Uncertain interactions among agents can
be studied within the framework of dynamic non-zero-sum
multi-player games. A special class of such problems are
pursuit-evasion games (PEGs) with multiple players which
seek to capture or evade each other. In this paper, we consider
the problem of steering an evader to a target location while
avoiding capture by multiple pursuers. Finding the exact
solution to such a pursuit-evasion game can be a complex task
due to the high dimensionality of the problem. In particular,
the state space of the PEG consists of high-dimensional vectors
that correspond to the concatenations of the position and
velocity vectors of all the players involved. Similarly, the
combined action space of all the players can be also high-
dimensional.
In this paper, the state space and the action space of the
PEG are both continuous. Obtaining exact solutions to this
class of problems can be a very complex task and thus,
the characterization of approximate solutions is preferred in
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practice. We use min-max Q-learning to obtain an approx-
imation of a Q-function that can characterize the evader’s
payoff (reward) for actions taken by the different players from
any state. It is desirable to have the results of the learning
process be independent of specific parameters of the training
instances, particularly in terms of the number of players and
their speeds. To this aim, the learning is performed in a
low-dimensional manifold, which is obtained by applying a
nonlinear transformation to the continuous state space, and a
discrete abstraction of the continuous action space (feature-
based action space). In the learning space, the interaction of
the players in the pursuit-evasion game is described purely in
terms of times to capture under different conditions, and the
discrete actions are designed to correspond to the intent of
the different players. The approximate Q-function is used to
construct a matrix that describes a two-player game per stage.
The solution to the matrix game yields the evader’s action
strategy at the current stage. The pursuers may either employ
the strategy induced by the latter game or a predetermined
policy such as relay pursuit (i.e., only the nearest pursuer to
the evader tries to capture the latter).
Literature survey: Multi-player pursuit evasion games are
extensively used to model interactions in economics, biology
and defense, to name a few [1]–[3]. Multi-player games are
typically non-zero sum, and may be played in continuous or
discrete time. Non-cooperative multi-player games, including
matrix games, are discussed in detail by Basar and Olsder [4].
Matrix games, also discussed by Zaccour et. al in [5], could
be single act (static games) or multi-act (repeated or dynamic
games) [6]. Well-known results pertaining to existence of
Nash equilibria for single-stage matrix games can be found
in [4]. The question of existence of Nash equilibria in repeated
games is addressed by the so-called folk theorem [7]. Multi-
player pursuit-evasion games with the emphasis placed either
on capture or evasion have been addressed in [8]–[16]. The
latter references use approaches which are based on geometric
arguments, such as dynamic Voronoi partitions, switching
strategies, Voronoi-based roadmaps as well as greedy pursuit
policies.
A Markov game-formulation of the discrete multi-agent
PEG in an uncertain environment is treated using a matrix
game approach in [17]. In our previous work [18], the multi-
agent dynamic non-zero-sum game was re-formulated as a
sequence of discrete zero-sum matrix games. The evader’s
myopic strategy corresponded to the solution to a linear
program that was solved at each stage. In this paper, we retain
this basic solution structure, however, we improve our previous
formulation of the matrix game using Q-learning to learn the
elements of the payoff/cost matrix. Q-learning techniques are
popular tools for the characterization of optimal policies in
decision making problems in uncertain environments involving
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2either a single player or multiple players [19]–[24]. For two-
player zero-sum games that are cast as Markov games, min-
max Q-learning is applied where the definition of the Q-
function is modified to suit the presence of a second, inde-
pendent decision-maker. The use of min-max Q-learning has
been demonstrated for simple problems with discrete state and
action spaces in [20] and an integral Q-learning algorithm for
continuous differential games is presented in [23]. An expo-
sition of different Q-learning algorithms for Markov games is
found in [22], where the authors also present an improved
learning algorithm to compute mixed policies. Multi-agent
reinforcement learning, using different value functions for the
agents, is presented in [25]. In [24], concurrent Q-learning
is used by both pursuing and evading agents to learn their
optimal policies. A critical overview of reinforcement learning
for multi-agent problems can be found in [26], [27]. Finally,
examples of the use of deep learning to solve multi-agent
problems in dynamic environments are presented in [28], [29].
Contributions: In this paper, we first propose a systematic
way to reduce a multi-agent dynamic non-zero-sum game
to a sequence of two-player static zero-sum games each of
which can be formulated as a linear program. In this set-up,
the payoffs of each static game will determine the action of
the evader at that stage, and this, in turn, will determine the
performance of the evader’s strategy. We construct the payoffs
taking into account (i) a risk metric for the evader with regard
to its capture, and (ii) the time required by the evader to reach
the target location. In order to refine the performance of the
evader’s strategy, we employ a min-max Q-learning algorithm
to determine the entries of the payoff matrix at each stage of
the game.
In our approach, learning takes place in a low-dimensional
nonlinear manifold (learning space) embedded in the original
high-dimensional state space. The states in this reduced space
capture the salient features of the pursuit-evasion game using
time-of-capture parameters rather than position and velocity.
Consequently, the new state space is invariant with respect
to the number of players or the dynamic model of the
players which is a key property of our proposed approach.
Furthermore, we associate the continuous action space of the
players to a feature-based action space which is a discrete
space comprised of a small number of actions. The set of
discrete actions is informed by the members of the continuous
action space. These actions affect the time-to-capture, and/or
the time-to-target, of one or more players. Our choice of
discrete actions does not restrict the movement of the evader
to pre-specified spatial directions, but rather, allows the evader
to move in different spatial directions as required by the
configuration of each game.
Structure of the paper: In Section II, we define the target-
seeking evasion problem, and in Section III, we formulate the
corresponding multi-act two-person zero-sum game. The set-
up for min-max Q-learning in the context of our problem, and
the learning process are described in Section IV and Section V
respectively. Numerical simulations and observations are given
in Section VI. In Section VII, we present concluding remarks.
II. FORMULATION OF TARGET-SEEKING EVASION
PROBLEM
Consider a pursuit-evasion game with N pursuers and one
evader that takes place in a domain D ⊆ R2. We will assume
that there is an upper bound on the duration of the game which
is known a priori and is denoted by T¯f > 0. For the sake of
simplicity, we demonstrate the proposed solution technique in
a reach-avoid game where all the players have single integrator
dynamics. At any given time t ∈ [0, T¯f ], the state (position)
of the ith pursuer Pi, where i ∈ I := {1, . . . , N}, is denoted
by xic ∈ R2, whereas the state (position) of the single evader
E at time t is denoted by xec ∈ R2. The dynamic equations
are given by:
x˙ic(t) = vpiuic(t), xic(0) = x¯i, (1a)
x˙ec(t) = veuec(t), xec(0) = x¯e, (1b)
where vpi > 0 and ve > 0 denote respectively the maximum
speeds of the ith pursuer and the evader. Further, uic(t) ∈ R2
and uec(t) ∈ R2 denote the inputs of the ith pursuer and the
evader at time t, respectively, and are assumed to take values
in the set U := {u ∈ R2 : ‖u‖ = 1 or u = 0}. The zero
control input will be used by the players only when the game
terminates (either by capture of the evader by at least one
pursuer, or by the evader reaching its target location).
The framework of matrix games applied to a continuous-
time dynamic game requires the choice of actions, repeatedly,
at each instant of time. While the state space of the game
and the action space are both continuous, we will consider
a discrete-time state-space model for the players in Eq. (1),
wherein the control input is piece-wise constant. That is,
the control input is a constant vector in each time interval
[k∆t, (k + 1)∆t), where k is a positive integer and ∆t ≥ 0
is the sampling period. The game consists of K¯ + 1 finite
stages at most, with a constant time step ∆t > 0, such that
T¯f := K¯∆t. Note that at time t = k∆t, the discrete-time
state of the ith pursuer, is denoted by xid(k), and is defined
as xid(k) := xic(k∆t). Similarly, the discrete-time states are
defined for the other players. If k ∈ {0, ..., K¯} denotes the
current stage of the game, and xid(k) is the state vector of
the ith pursuer at that stage and xed(k) is the state vector of
the evader, the discrete-time state-space model for the players
is described by the following equations:
xid(k + 1) = xid(k) + (vpi∆t)uid(k), xid(0) = x¯i, (2a)
xed(k + 1) = xed(k) + (ve∆t)ued(k), xed(0) = x¯e, (2b)
where uid(k), ued(k) ∈ U denote the inputs of the ith pursuer
and the evader at stage k, respectively. The discrete-time
control input corresponds to a piece-wise constant continuous-
time signal, that is, uic(τ) := uid(k) for all τ ∈ [k∆t, (k +
1)∆t) for all k ∈ {0, ..., K¯ − 1}.
In this paper, we assume that the pursuers have a preferred
strategy. In particular, they engage in what is known as “relay
pursuit” with corresponding relay metric the minimum time-
to-capture [11]. At each instant of time, the active pursuer is
the one corresponding to the smallest time-to-capture (among
the pursuers). In relay pursuit, only one pursuer is active,
that is, engages in pursuit, whereas the other pursuers are
stationary. The assignment of the active pursuer can change
with time based on which pursuer has the least time-to-capture.
3If the active pursuer is designated by the index i?, then, for
all t ∈ [0, tf ], the feedback strategy of the ith pursuer is
u∗id(xed,xid) =
{
rcd/‖rcd‖, if i = i?,
0 otherwise,
(3)
where rid := xed − xid is the relative position vector of
the evader with respect to the ith pursuer. Relay pursuit is
a suitable choice of strategy for a group of pursuers in which
each agent wishes to remain spatially localized, or to conserve
resources.
Capture occurs when the evader’s distance from at least one
pursuer is less than the radius of capture ` > 0. That is, the
game will terminate in capture at stage K ∈ {0, . . . , K¯} (for
a given positive integer K¯), if there exists i ∈ I : ‖xid(K)−
xed(K)‖ ≤ `. The target is denoted by xT ∈ R2. The evader is
considered to be successful in reaching the target if ‖xed(K)−
xT ‖ ≤ , where  > 0. The multi-player reach-avoid problem
in discrete-time is stated as follows:
Problem 1: Let K¯ be a positive integer and let us assume
that the initial positions of the pursuers x¯i, for i ∈ I, and the
initial position of the evader, x¯e, be given. Find a sequence
of control inputs {ued(k)}K−1k=0 , where K is a positive integer
with K ≤ K¯ (K corresponds to the free terminal stage), which
will guide the evader to the target xT ∈ D within the desired
tolerance, while avoiding capture, that is, ‖xed(K)−xT ‖ ≤ ,
and ‖xed(k)− xid(k)‖ > `, ∀i ∈ I,∀k ∈ {0, 1, ..,K}.
We assume that the players have perfect information about the
states of all the players of the game at all times. In addition,
the target xT is known only to the evader. Note that the evader
has two goals: (a) reaching the target location, and (b) avoiding
capture, whereas the group of pursuers has only one: to achieve
capture of the evader as soon as possible.
For compactness of notation, subsequently, the subscript d
is dropped from the state and control vector notations at the
corresponding stage k.
III. MATRIX GAME FORMULATION OF THE MULTI-PLAYER
PEG
In this section, we re-formulate the discrete-time non-zero-
sum game with N + 1 players described in Problem 1 as a
multi-act two person zero-sum matrix game. The group of
pursuers is considered as a single entity, P , with the ability
to deploy exactly one of the pursuers at a given instant of
time. At each stage k of the latter game, we consider a matrix
Mk ∈ RN×(N+1)≥0 , whose entries are the payoffs to E at that
stage. Each row of Mk represents a pure strategy played by P
and each column, a pure strategy played by E. The decision
space available to the players (the space of control inputs for P
and E) is continuous and contains infinite number of actions.
We consider a restricted decision space for P , including only
the actions that appear “integral” to the pursuers’ goal of
capturing the evader. In particular, P has exactly N pure
strategies, where the ith pure strategy corresponds to the case
where only the ith pursuer goes after the evader. Similarly, E’s
restricted decision space consists of N + 1 actions, where the
first N correspond to evasion from each pursuer in turn (the
jth action is to avoid only the jth pursuer), and the (N +1)th
TABLE I: Entries in the payoff matrix Mk, for the case of
N = 2.
(1,1) (1,2) (1,3)
P1 in pursuit P1 in pursuit P1 in pursuit
E evading P1 E evading P2 E seeks xT
(2,1) (2,2) (2,3)
P2 in pursuit P2 in pursuit P2 in pursuit
E evading P1 E evading P2 E seeks xT
action is the target-seeking behavior, which means that the
evader directly heads towards the target.
Let i be the row index of Mk and j be the column index,
where i ∈ I and j ∈ J := {1, . . . , N + 1}. If we consider
the first N columns of Mk, each entry Mk(i, j) with i = j
is the payoff for the two-player zero-sum game between only
the ith pursuer and the evader. Every other entry Mk(i, j),
with i 6= j, represents a case when E tries to evade from
the jth pursuer, when actually the ith pursuer is active. This
situation can happen because while the E knows the states
of all the pursuers, it does not know the action chosen by P
at the same stage. Finally, the last column of the matrix Mk
represents cases where the evader is directly headed towards
the target xT , and only one pursuer is active per row. A
schematic construction of the matrix Mk is shown in Table
I.
The payoff matrix of the matrix game has to be updated at
every stage of the game because the players move between
every pair of successive stages and the entries of the payoff
matrix must change to reflect the underlying dynamic evolu-
tion of the game. For this reason, our matrix game formulation
differs from the class of games known as repeated static
games. Constructing and updating the entries of the payoff
matrix is central to developing a successful strategy for the
evader that can lead it to the target while avoiding capture.
The values in the payoff matrix must represent the two-fold
goal of the evader.
1) Time metrics of the reach-avoid game: Next, we in-
troduce a number of time-metrics that will be used in the
subsequent analysis. All these metrics are associated with the
minimum positive solution to the following equation [6]:
(v2e − v2pi)φ2 + 2(〈ri, veue〉− `vpi)φ+ 〈ri, ri〉− `2 = 0, (4)
where ri := xe−xi and xe and xi correspond to the position
of the evader and the ith pursuer at the beginning of the
game (at stage k, where 0 ≤ k < K¯), for different values
of the vector ue. In particular, the min-max time-to-capture
of the evader by the ith pursuer, ignoring all other players, is
denoted as φc(xe,xi) and is defined as the minimum positive
real solution to the equation (4) when ue := ri/‖ri‖ (the
ith pursuer uses the control input ui := ri/‖ri‖). Similarly,
let φa(xe,xi,ue) denote the minimum time-to-capture of the
evader by the ith pursuer when the evader is moving in a
randomly chosen fixed direction denoted by ue. Ideally, this
particular maneuver does not avoid any pursuer in particular,
but may delay capture by exploiting the relative positioning
of the pursuers around the evader. It is possible to improve
this particular evasion maneuver by taking into account the
dynamic models of the players. In particular, φa(xe,xi,ue)
4is the minimum real positive solution to Eq. (4), where ue
represents the direction of the evader’s random maneuver.
Finally, let φs(xe,xi,xT ) denote the minimum time-to-
capture of the evader by the ith pursuer when the evader
is directly headed towards the target location, in which case,
φs(xe,xi,xT ) is the minimum real positive solution to Eq. (4)
with ue = (xT − xe)/‖xT − xe‖. Note that in this case, the
evader does not maneuver to avoid the pursuer, and only the
pursuer is maneuvering to minimize the capture time. Finally,
let φT (xe,xT ) denote the minimum time for the evader to
reach the target.
A. Elements of the payoff matrix
In the current matrix game formulation, each element of the
payoff matrix is a numerical value that reflects the two-fold
objective of the evader: (a) to avoid capture and (b) to reach
the target location xT . The two components of each entry
are the time that P would take to capture E, and the extent
to which E’s heading is towards xT from its current location.
The target-seeking component of E’s velocity is equal to cos θ,
where θ is the angle between the vectors ue and xT − xe.
Because at least two players have moved in the time
between the current stage and the previous stage, one has to
re-construct the payoff matrix at each stage. While a future
payoff is as important as the present payoff for consideration,
it is difficult to estimate the payoff that the evader will receive
at the end of K stages, since the payoffs at each stage
are dependent on the players’ states in the current stage.
Thus, the history of moves in previous play is reflected in
the changing payoff values, although this information is not
available directly to the players as a strategy recall.
The payoffs are designed to reflect the long-term effects of
each action. In this case, since we have an upper bound T¯f
on the duration of the game, the time-of-capture component is
bounded. For each pair of pure strategies (i, j), we calculate
the minimum time-of-capture of E by the pursuing agent i.
Note that E will play the strategy corresponding to evasion
from the pursuer j. If capture is not possible, we set the value
to T¯f . The target-seeking component is given by cos θ, as
described earlier. Algorithm 1 shows the main steps for the
assignment of payoffs to Mk:
input : xe, xT , xi ∀i ∈ I, k, T¯f
output : Mk
for i← 1 to N do
for j ← 1 to N + 1 do
Tc = min(φa(xe,xi,uj), T¯f )
Gc =
〈ue,xT−xe〉
‖ue‖‖xT−xe‖
Mk1(i, j) = Tc
Mk2(i, j) = Gc
end
end
Mˆk1 =
Mk1
maxi,jM(i,j)k1
Mk = Mˆk1 +Mk2
Algorithm 1: Payoff Assignment to Mk
Note that we normalize the evasion component which is given
by the matrix Mk1 using the maximum entry of the matrix.
This ensures that all evasion components have values between
zero and unity, with magnitude similar to the target-seeking
component. The summation of the two components in this
manner is a standard practice in multi-objective optimization
where the objectives are combined into one global criterion
[30].
B. Solution to the matrix game
We proceed to solve for the equilibrium strategies for
the players. An equivalent non-zero sum formulation for our
problem would consider the whole N + 1 player game, with
cost assignments that are functions of the states of all players.
Consequently, verifying the existence of an equilibrium set of
pure strategies is a hard problem, in the sense that it would
require an exhaustive search among all possibilities. However,
we know that a two-player zero-sum multi-act game which is
finite, admits a saddle point solution in mixed strategies [4].
The min-max solution to the matrix game at stage k
consists to two vectors of probabilities (discrete probability
distributions), one for the evader E which is denoted by piek,
and one for the group of pursuers as a whole which is denoted
by pipk. These vectors correspond to the mixed strategies of the
two players. Each entry of the vector representing the mixed
strategy of a player corresponds to the probability with which
each pure strategy is to be chosen, when the game is played
with infinite turns. The discrete action chosen at each stage k
is a random sample from the probability distribution assigned
by the mixed strategy. Note that the matrix formulation enables
the conversion of the (N+1)-player dynamic game to the two-
player decision-making problem with discrete action choices
for each player.
In particular, at stage k, the mixed strategy for P , pipk ∈
RN , given by pipk :=
[
pi1pk, . . . , pi
N
pk
]T
, with
∑N
i=1 pi
i
pk = 1,
and piipk ≥ 0. In other words, the mixed strategy for the
N pursuers can be defined, by considering a member of the
simplex of dimension N − 1, for the first N − 1 probabilities
(the N th probability is obtained as the difference of their sum
from unity). Similarly for E, the mixed strategy is denoted
by piek ∈ RN+1, where piek :=
[
pi1ek, . . . , pi
N+1
ek
]T
, and∑N+1
j=1 pi
j
ek = 1, and pi
j
ek ≥ 0. The ith (respectively, jth) entry
of the vector pipk (respectively, piek) represents the probability
of the ith (respectively, the jth) pure strategy being employed
by P (respectively, E). We only choose one pure strategy for
each player per stage of the game. However, in the limiting
case (for a game of infinite stages), the frequency at which
each pure strategy is chosen converges to the probabilities
assigned to the pure strategies by the mixed strategies pipk and
piek. The problems of computing the vectors pi∗pk and pi
∗
ek that
correspond to the saddle point of the (min-max) game can be
formulated as Linear Programming (LP) problems [5], which
can be solved using readily available solvers. In particular, pi?pk
corresponds to the solution to the following LP problem:
min
(p,pipk)
p
subject to p1 ≥MTk pipk,
5pipk ≥ 0,
1Tpipk = 1. (5)
where 1 := [1, . . . , 1]T ∈ RN . Similarly, for the computation
of pi?ek, one has to solve the following LP problem:
max
(q,piek)
q
subject to q1 ≤Mkpiek,
piek ≥ 0,
1Tpiek = 1. (6)
Note that the LP problem (5) whose solution is pi?ek is the dual
to the LP problem (6) whose solution is pi?pk. From strong du-
ality, we have that maxpiek pi
∗T
pkMkpiek = minpipk pi
T
pkMkpi
∗
ek.
The two LPs (5) and (6) are solved at each stage of the
game after we recompute Mk to account for the change of
the players’ locations between successive stages. In practice,
the actions (pure strategies) for a particular stage of the game
are obtained as random samples from the discrete distributions
given by pi∗pk and pi
∗
ek for that stage of the game.
IV. NEW MATRIX FORMULATION OF THE MULTI-AGENT
PEG WITH Q-LEARNING
In the formulation of the matrix game described so far, the
size of the matrix depends on N , the number of pursuers.
In addition, the action space of the evader is comprised of
actions that restrict the evader to switch between pure evasion
(try to delay as much as possible the capture by the active
pursuer) and goal-seeking (reach the goal destination as fast
as possible). Next, we propose a new payoff matrix, whose
structure renders it independent of the number of pursuers,
as well as the number of actions that are available to the
evader. Further, we are interested in improving the payoff
function that determines the payoff matrix, so that the evader’s
strategy performs better in terms of guiding the evader to the
target without getting captured. To construct this new payoff
function, we propose to use Q-learning techniques, with the
intention of recognizing possible patterns of play in the multi-
agent game, which lead to a better evasion strategy.
At each stage k of the game, we consider a new matrix
Mk ∈ RNp×Ne≥0 , whose entries are the payoffs (rewards) to E
at that stage. Alternatively, the entries of Mk can be viewed
as the costs incurred by the group of pursuers as a whole.
Again, since the payoffs to the evader and the pursuer group
sum to zero, the matrix represents a zero-sum game with the
evader as the maximizing agent and the group of pursuers as
the minimizers. Each row of Mk represents a pure strategy,
pi, i ∈ {1, ..., Np}, played by the group of pursuers and each
column represents a pure strategy, ej , i ∈ {1, .., Ne}, which
is played by E. Each pure strategy qualitatively describes an
action taken by the corresponding player or players. Note that
the learning space which is used in the learning process is the
output of a nonlinear transformation applied to the original
(high-dimensional) state space. Further, the action space used
for learning corresponds to a feature-based action set, which
is an abstraction of the physical action set available to the
players.
A. Discrete action sets for the players
The set of actions for the evader, which is denoted by Ae,
is a finite set comprised of Ne elements. Similarly, a finite
set Ap comprising Np actions is considered for the group of
pursuers. To streamline the subsequent discussion and analysis,
we choose Ne = 4 and Np = 2. The choice of actions for each
player (either as an individual or as a group) is motivated by
the qualitative effect of each action on the game. The actions
that are considered for the group of pursuers are denoted by
pi ∈ Ap, i ∈ {1, ..., Np}, and are described qualitatively as
follows:
1) p1: the pursuers engage in relay pursuit, that is, only
the pursuer closest to the evader engages in pursuit
while the others maintain their current state of operation
(remaining static).
2) p2: all pursuers actively engage in pursuit of the evader
simultaneously and non-cooperatively.
Note that the focus of this work is on the characterization of an
evasion strategy rather than a pursuit strategy. For this reason,
we have assumed that the pursuers have a preferred strategy,
namely relay pursuit [11]. However, in the construction of the
matrix game in our approach, the pursuers are not required
to adopt the relay pursuit strategy (p1) at all times. They
can adopt instead an alternative pursuit strategy (p2). Not
having the pursuit strategy fixed at all times is important
in the learning process, to increase the robustness of the
evader’s learned policy. The evader’s actions, denoted by
ej ∈ Ae, j ∈ {1, .., Ne}, are described as follows:
1) e1: the evader engages in pure evasion from the nearest
pursuer.
2) e2: the evader performs a “collective evasion” maneuver
which considers all the pursuers at once.
3) e3: the evader heads directly towards the target.
4) e4: the evader moves normal to the line of sight from
the closest pursuer, that is, normal to the direction in
action e1.
The physical realization of the discrete actions can be any
vector direction. The physical realization of each of these
actions is straightforward except for the action e2, which is
explained below. The schematic physical realizations of the
discrete actions of the evader are illustrated in Fig. 1.
Characterization of action e2: In a frame with the evader
at the origin, consider all the angles formed between the lines
of sight to two adjacent pursuers in order. The direction of
motion of the evader corresponds to the bisector of the largest
angle formed at the evader’s position. This is equivalent to the
evader moving towards the largest gap between the pursuers.
The intent of this evasion action is to make the evader move
away from the entire group of pursuers at once (group evasion
action), instead of evading only one in particular. This action is
useful when the direction of optimal evasion from one pursuer
(say the ith one) puts the evader directly in the line of sight
of another pursuer (say the jth one, j 6= i). If θi is the angle
between the lines of sight from the evader to the ith pursuer
and to the (i + 1)th pursuer, then we calculate the resultant
direction of motion of the evader as follows:
ue = [cos(θr + ωim) sin(θr + ωim)]
T
6(a) Action e1 for N = 3 (b) Action e2 for N = 4 (c) Action e3 for N = 3 (d) Action e4 for N = 4
Fig. 1: Schematic physical realization of evasive actions for an evader with simple dynamics. The pursuers are represented as red circles
and the evader in blue. The blue arrow indicates the direction of motion of the evader determined by the corresponding evasion action.
where ωi := ]ri denotes the polar angle of the vector ri :=
xe − xi, and
θi : = ωi+1 − ωi, θi ∈ [0, 2pi],
im : = arg max
i
θi,
θr : =
θim
2
,
for i = {1, ..., N − 1}. If i = N , we set ωN+1 := ω1 to
preserve the order of rotation. The evasion action is illustrated
in Fig. 2.
(a) Action e2 for N = 3 (b) Action e2 for N = 4
Fig. 2: Schematic representation of evasive action e2 for players with
simple dynamics. The pursuers are represented as red circles and the
evader in blue. The blue arrow indicates the direction of motion of
the evader determined by the corresponding evasion action.
The evader (shown in blue) should move along the blue
arrow according to the action e2. In Fig. 2a, the evader is
outside the polygon formed by the pursuers (shown in red)
as vertices, and the evader’s direction of motion is between
pursuers P1 and P2. In Fig. 2b, the evader is inside the polygon
of the pursuers, and the preferred bisector lies between P2 and
P3. If two angular gaps are equal, the evader favors the angular
gap formed by the longer line of sight to a pursuer.
B. Q-learning for the matrix payoffs
The payoff matrix Mk at each stage k has a fixed size for
any number of pursuers, and the discrete action sets compre-
hensively describe the qualitative effects of the players’ actions
in the game. However, for the multi-agent game (N > 1), the
optimal payoff function, and consequently the entries of the
payoff matrix, are not readily available analytically. Hence, we
use min-max Q-learning to construct the entries of the payoff
matrix Mk at each stage.
Before we describe the Q-learning procedure, we must
introduce a new state space where the Q-learning process can
take place. This is because it is not practical to carry out the
learning process effectively using position vectors as states
and physical directions as corresponding actions (this would
be an intractable approach). In the position space, a set of
optimal actions learned by the players from a particular initial
configuration, does not enable them to maneuver correctly
from other initial configurations, because the environment is
not static. Further, the speeds of the players and their number
largely influence the weights learned, which in turn influence
the optimality of each action for the players. Consequently,
we are unable to extend the results (learned weights) to other
environments that are similar but with a different number
of players and with different speeds. The rewards for the
reinforcement learning procedure also cannot be explicitly
position-dependent, since the reward for the same state-action
pair in another game with different initial conditions would be
different.
In this context, we introduce a new state space in which the
states are transformed representations of the players’ position
vectors and also encode other properties of the pursuit-evasion
game. In particular, we recognize that the times-to-capture
and the time-to-target are sufficient to accurately describe and
decide the progress of the game. Moreover, it is the ratio of
the time-to-target to the time-to-capture or the time to intercept
(φT /φc or φT /φs respectively), which reflects the safety (in
the sense of staying sufficiently far away from the pursuers)
and target-reaching ability of the evader at all times. With these
considerations, we next describe the state space in which the
learning process is carried out.
C. Learning state space
The learning state space Ψ is a subset of Rm≥0, where
Rm≥0 := {z ∈ Rm : zj ≥ 0, j ∈ {1, ...,m}}. The learning
state variables are implicitly dependent on the position and
velocity of the players at a given stage. For the multi-agent
7PEG, m = 4. At any stage k ∈ {1, ...,K}, let us introduce
the following variables:
1) The least min-max time-to-capture of the evader over all
the pursuers, which is given by
ψc(k;xe) := min
i
φc(xe,xi). (7)
2) The least minimum time-of-intercept of the evader by a
pursuer when the evader is moving in a randomly chosen
and fixed direction that is known to pursuers, which is
defined as follows
ψa(k;xe,ue) := min
i
φa(xe,xi,ue), (8)
whereψa(k;xe,ue) corresponds to the time-of-intercept
when the evader executes action e2.
3) The minimum time for the evader to reach the target
state in the absence of pursuers which is defined as
follows:
ψT (k;xe,xT ) := φT (xe,xT ). (9)
4) The least minimum time-of-intercept of the evader by
a pursuer when the evader heads directly towards the
target location which is given by
ψs(k;xe,xT ) := min
i
φs(xe,xi,xT ). (10)
For ease of notation, we denote the learning state variables
as explicit functions of the stage k, while in fact, they are
functions of the position vectors at time t = k∆t. Let S :
R→ [0, 1] be a sigmoid function. At stage k, the state vector
in the learning space Ψ ⊆ Rm≥0 is denoted by ψ(k;xe,xT )
and defined as follows:
ψ(k;xe,xT ) :=
[
S( ψc
ψT
) S( ψa
ψT
) S( ψs
ψT
)
ψT
]T
.
The first three state variables depend on the ratios of the
time-metrics introduced in Section III with respect to the time-
to-target (this choice is justified by the fact that the evader is
the maximizing agent in the two-player static game). We wish
to maximize the ratio of the time-to-capture (or intercept) to
the time to reach the target. The following are the desirable
attributes of the learning state space:
1) The learning state space is a subset of Rm≥0 for all
N . This means that for any number of pursuers, N ,
the learning state space has a constant dimension. This
greatly reduces the computational expense associated
with solving the matrix game at each stage.
2) The state variables of the learning space furnish a
feature-based representation of the original position
space. In other words, we capture the essential features
of the game using just m variables, instead of 2(N + 1)
position variables. The feature-based representation is
important in identifying states in the game which are
far apart in the position space, but are similar in terms
of imminent capture or proximity to the target.
Note that to propagate the dynamics forward in time and
perform state updates, we are still required to operate in the
physical space. In the next section, we will describe in detail
how we use min-max Q-learning to obtain the entries of the
payoff matrix. The training of the players in the transformed
state space enables the players in the game to maneuver
correctly in environments other than the one used for training.
The schematic of the learning process applied to the matrix
game is shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3: Learning applied to matrix game framework for pursuit-
evasion, shown for a single stage.
V. APPROXIMATION OF THE PAYOFF MATRIX WITH
MIN-MAX Q-LEARNING
Let Tq : Rm≥0 × Ae × Ap → Rm≥0 be the state transition
function which maps the state ψ(k) at stage k to the state at
the next stage, k + 1, if the actions chosen by P and E at
stage k are pi and ej , respectively. We write
ψ(k + 1) = Tq(ψ(k), pi, ej).
The transition function is determined by the dynamics of the
players. In practice, we choose to perform this state update in
the position space rather than directly in the learning space. Let
the function Rq : Rm≥0×Ap×Ae → R be the reward received
by E for each state transition. Further, let Hq : Rm≥0 ×Ae ×
R2 → [−1, 1] be the “heading” function. The heading function
maps the state ψ(k) to the component ϑ of the evader’s unit
velocity, obtained by projecting E’s velocity on the line of
sight to the target xT . For instance, if the action chosen by E
at stage k is ej , we have
Hq(ψ(k), ej ,xe;xT ) := − ddtφT (xe(t);xT )
∣∣
t=k∆t
.
The above relation follows directly from the definition of
the time-to-target for the evader in the absence of all pursuers,
that is, φT (xe(t);xT ) := ‖xT − xe(t)‖/ve. The Q-function,
denoted by Q : Rm≥0 × Ap × Ae → R, maps every tuple
(state, pursuers’ action, evader’s action) to a payoff value for
E. Given the definition of the Q-function at stage k, for all pi
8for i ∈ {1, . . . , Np} and for all ej , for j ∈ {1, . . . , Ne}, the
payoff matrix Mk = [Mk(i, j)] is set to be:
Mk(i, j) := Q(ψ(k), pi, ej ;xe,x1, . . . ,xN ,xT ). (11)
Since the state space is continuous, it is not practical to use a
table of Q-values to determine the optimal state-action-action
tuples. If such a grid of states is used to generate a look-
up table for the Q-function, we must rely on interpolation
to calculate the payoff values at intermediate states. A very
fine grid of discrete states would have large computational
overhead, while we might still miss out on identifying an
essential “feature” of a given state. For this reason, we desire
generalization, wherein we can operate on the qualitative
abstraction of a state rather its exact quantitative value which
might not have been experienced during learning [19]. For
instance, a state may be encountered during the game, which
has times to capture and intercept that were never encountered
during the training process. However, this new state with
the combination of times to capture and intercept may be
relatable to another known state with its own set of capture and
intercept times, based on the criterion that in both cases, the
evader can safely reach the target. This is one such example
of extracting the qualitative information given by a state.
Following generalization, we use an approximation of the Q-
function as a weighted linear combination of a finite number of
feature-based functions of the states and actions. In this case,
the weights are learned iteratively using gradient-descent. In
our implementation, there is no restriction on the magnitude
and sign of the weights, which are all real numbers.
A. Linear approximation of the Q-function
Motivated by the previous discussion, the basis functions for
the Q-function approximation are chosen as the coordinates of
the new state obtained from executing one action of the evader
and one action by the group of pursuers simultaneously. In
particular, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , Np} and j ∈ {1, . . . , Ne},
Q(ψ(k), pi, ej) = wTq ζ(ψ(k), pi, ej ;xT ), (12)
where both Q(ψ(k), pi, ej) and ζ(ψ(k), pi, ej) are depen-
dent on the states of all the players and the target location
(xe,x1, . . . ,xN ,xT ), and where
ζ(ψ(k), pi, ej ;xe;xT ) :=
Hq(ψ(k), ej ,xe;xT )(Tq(ψ(k), pi, ej))1(Tq(ψ(k), pi, ej))2
(Tq(ψ(k), pi, ej))3
 .
Note that wq is independent of k and ψ(k), as well as the
choice of actions by the players. For a zero-sum game, the
min-max Q algorithm aims to iteratively approximate [26] the
Q-function Q(·) that satisfies the following equation:
Q(ψ(k), pi, ej ;xe,xT ) = Rq(ψ(k), pi, ej ;xe,xT )
+ min
i′
(rowi′(Mk+1)piek), (13)
where rowi′(Mk+1) denotes the row vector that corresponds
to the i′-th row of the matrix Mk+1 = [Mk+1(i′, j′)] with
Mk+1(i
′, j′) := Q(Tq(ψ(k + 1)), pi′ , ej′ ;xe,xT ). The min-
max Q-learning process is outlined in Algorithm 2.
Note that the assumption that the relay pursuit strategy is the
preferred strategy for the group of pursuers does restrict their
Input : Ae, Ap, Rq and Tq (dynamics), Ntr (maximum
training episodes), α (learning rate), γ (discount
factor), tol (convergence tolerance), δα (decay
in learning rate), β (exploration probability), δβ
(decay in exploration).
1. Initialize each element of wq to a random sample
from a uniform distribution in (0, 1)
2. Number of training game episodes n = 0
3. while n ≤ Ntr or ‖δwq‖ > tol do
a. Pick random initial conditions x¯e, xT , x¯i ∀i ∈ I
b. Initialize k = 0
c. while game episode is not over do
i. Calculate ψ(k)
ii. for i = 1 to Np do
for j = 1 to Ne do
Mk(i, j) = Q(ψ(k), pi, ej)
end
end
iii. Find mixed strategies piek and pipk
iv. V (ψ(k)) = mini(rowi(Mk)piek)
v. With probability β choose an action e¯ for E at
random from set Ae
otherwise,
Choose an action e¯ for E based on piek
vi. Choose an action p¯ for P based on pipk
v. ∆ = Rq(ψ(k), p¯, e¯) + γV (ψ(k + 1)
−Q(ψ(k), p¯, e¯)
vi. δwq = α ·∆ ζ(ψ(k), p¯, e¯)
vii. wq := wq + δwq
viii. Perform one-step update of the state
ix. k := k + 1
end
d. α := α · δα
e. β := β − δβ
f. n := n+ 1
end
Output: wq
Algorithm 2: Linear approximation of the Q-function
using min-max Q-learning.
choice of action to p1 exclusively. If we assume during the
learning process that the group of pursuers is required to use
relay pursuit at all states, then the problem becomes a decision
making problem for a single-agent in a dynamic environment.
In that case, the static game at every stage corresponds to a
Markov Decision Process (MDP) because there is only one
available action for the agent opposing the evader. In our
proposed approach, we train the evader to be able to handle
both relay pursuit and a completely non-cooperative pursuit
strategy. This is choice is intended to increase the robustness
of the proposed learning-based solution approach. Hence, we
have a Markov Game [22] with the opposing agent having two
actions (p1 and p2) to choose from.
B. Reward function
The choice of the reward function Rq directly influences
the learning process in terms of learning desired behavior as
well as the time taken to converge to a policy. In particular, for
9problems with a desired terminal state (such as the one con-
sidered in this paper), the shaping of the reward is essential to
drive the evader towards the target location while avoiding the
pursuers. There is positive as well as negative reinforcement
in the reward function. Since the time-to-capture relative to
the time to goal is an important parameter in determining the
evader’s success, we define a reward function that consists of
the following three parts:
1) The target-heading reward, which is defined as:
Hq(ψ(k), ej ,xe,xT ) := − ddtψT (xe(t),xT )
∣∣
t=k∆t
.
(14)
2) The state-transition reward, Rs(ψ(k), Tq(ψ(k), pi, ej)),
which is a function of the current state and the next
state, and in particular, is defined as:
Rs(ψ(k), Tq(ψ(k), pi, ej)) := (Tq(ψ(k), pi, ej))3 − ψ3(k).
(15)
Note that we positively reward an increase in the time-
to-capture relative to the time-to-reach the target.
3) A terminal reward, g(ψ(k), ej), which is used to posi-
tively reward the evader for reaching the target
g(ψ, ej) :=

+1, if ψ4 = 0,
−1, if ψ1 = ψ2 = ψ3 = 0,
0, otherwise.
(16)
In practice, we can also determine the terminal reward based
on the state in the position space in order to avoid error due to
finite precision. Furthermore, the total reward associated with
a specific state transition is then given by
Rq(ψ(k), pi, ej ;xe,xT ) = Hq(ψ(k), ej ,xe,xT )
+Rs(ψ(k), Tq(ψ(k), pi, ej))
+ g(ψ(k), ej). (17)
Note that it is important to make the training rewards as
independent as possible of the time step and the specific values
of the states encountered in the training process. For this
reason, we consider the limit with respect to the sampling
period for the first term of the reward. When one feature of
the Q-function has either too large or too small of an influence
on the update of the weight vector w, that feature interferes
with the updates due to the other features. We ensure that
the range of the different reward functions and state variables
used in the learning process are comparable to each other so
that the interference is minimized in the linear update of the
weights.
VI. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we present numerical simulations that
demonstrate the performance of the evader using the improved
policy obtained by min-max Q-learning. The various parame-
ters chosen for the training process are: N = 3, vpi = ve = 1
for all i ∈ I, ∆t = 0.01, ` = 0.01,  = `, γ = 0.9, α = 0.1,
β = 0.9, δα = 0.9, and δβ was chosen such that the final value
of β = 0.01, at the end of the training which was performed
over Ntrn = 2000 episodes of games. First, we chose the
speed of the evader to be slower than that of the pursuers,
and in particular, ve = 0.9. For training, the initial conditions
of the players and the target location were randomly chosen
from a uniform distribution within a two-dimensional spatial
grid of unit size.
The discount factor γ ∈ [0, 1] determines if the learning
player prioritizes immediate rewards or long-term rewards.
Typically, the discount factor is chosen to be closer to 1,
indicating that long-term rewards are preferred. The choice
of learning rate α ∈ [0, 1] is critical, because a consistently
high learning rate will make the learning process sensitive to
every input, thereby making it difficult to obtain convergence
of weights. On the other hand, if α is too small, the learning
process will take a long time. In general, we start with a
nominal value of α = 0.1 and decay the learning rate as more
learning episodes are covered. Finally, in the beginning of the
learning process, some randomness is introduced in the choice
of actions of the learning player to ensure exploration of the
state-action space by the player.
At the termination of the learning process, after the weights
have converged to a specified tolerance, the performance of
the evader using the strategy determined by the solution
to the matrix game with Q-learning were compared with
its performance when using the strategy determined by the
solution to the N × (N + 1) matrix game, which does not
involve any learning. Results obtained with the utilization of
a different strategy determined by from another matrix game
with payoff matrix of size Np×Ne, where the payoff function
was taken to be the sum of the heading reward (as described
in Section V-B) and the minimum value of the learning state
variables, was also compared with the others. The package
cvx [31] as well as the built-in solver in MATLAB were used
to solve the linear programming problem.
We test the policy based on the learned payoff function
with a different number of pursuers than that used in training.
It is important to note that the size of the payoff matrix as
formulated for Q-learning is independent of the number of
agents in the game. In Table II we see the evader’s performance
for about 103 episodes of the multi-player game, where N = 5,
with initial conditions sampled from a uniform distribution
within a grid of size 10 units. Note that the grid size is also
different from the training grid size. The column headers,
which correspond to different solution methods, are to be
interpreted as follows:
1) M-1: Matrix game with Q-Learning with a Np × Ne
payoff matrix.
2) M-2: Matrix game without Learning with a N×(N+1)
payoff matrix.
3) M-3: Matrix game without Learning with a Np × Ne
payoff matrix.
The pursuers engage in relay pursuit at all times. From Table
II, it is clear that in the case of a slower evader, the three
matrix-based methods perform similarly. The success rate for
the slower evader is so low because of the number of faster
pursuers. There exist initial conditions for the players such
that the evader has no chance of success, which can be
determined by analyzing the times to capture and intercept.
As N increases, there is a greater chance that the evader fails
to reach the target uncaptured.
Next, we train the evader for the case when ve = 1. Then,
we test the evader’s performance for a different number of
pursuers and a large number of random initial conditions. In
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TABLE II: Outcome of games - ve = 0.9, N = 5
Solution Method M-1 M-2 M-3
Evader Captured 89.51% 89.84% 89.24%
Target Reached 10.49% 10.16% 10.76%
TABLE III: Outcome of games - ve = 1, N = 4
Solution Method M-1 M-2 M-3
Evader Captured 2.92% 9.55% 7.36%
Target Reached 87.51% 90.45% 92.64%
this case, we expect a much higher rate of success for the
evader, since it is as fast as the pursuers.
In Table III, we present the results for N = 4. We find that
all the solution approaches perform better than the previous
case, in terms of reaching the target. In terms of both avoiding
capture and reaching the target within the end time, the method
using Q-learning is better than the other two methods. Note
that the number of games that were inconclusive within our
simulation time limit is highest in the case of the evader using
the learned strategy. This means that even though the evader
was unable to reach the target, it managed to avoid capture or
at least delay it until the end of the simulation time. This is a
desirable behavior for the evader, which is not observed when
the other two strategies, M-2 and M-3, are employed. In the
subsequent figures, the pursuers are represented in red and the
evader in green. The capture disks around the pursuers and
the evader (using large square markers) are shown at certain
time instances during the game. The black dot represents the
target state. The evolution of the game for two sets of initial
conditions for using the solution methods M-1 and M-2 is
illustrated in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5.
(a) M-1 (b) M-2
Fig. 4: Evolution of a pursuit-evasion game, comparing methods M-1
and M-2, for N = 5.
In Fig. 6, the evader uses the action e4 in the normal
direction, to move towards the target, when the pursuer is
initially on the evader’s line of sight to the target. The pursuer
turns for a tail chase, but the evader is able to reach the
target within the required radius of tolerance. The black arrows
indicate the direction of motion of the evader.
We see that even in the cases where the other methods
give a good policy for the evader, the policy determined using
learned payoffs sometimes results in the evader reaching the
target quicker. This is another advantage of learning as seen
(a) M-1 (b) M-2
Fig. 5: Evolution of a pursuit-evasion game, comparing methods M-1
and M-2, for N = 5.
Fig. 6: N = 1, method M-1. The evader reaches the target in a game
where the pursuer is between the evader and the target initially.
in simulations, where the evader’s decisions are not always
intuitive, but lead to better performance in terms of reaching
the target. The evolution of the pursuit-evasion game in Fig. 7
elucidates the evader’s performance when initially the evader
is within the convex hull of the pursuers. In particular, the
evader’s initial position is at [4, 4]T and the pursuers are
initially at [5, 4]T, [3, 4]T, [4, 4.3]T and [4, 3.7]T. Clearly,
the learning-based strategy performs a swerve-like maneuver,
which is not mimicked in the other matrix payoff formulations.
Next, we examine the computational efficiency of the pro-
posed approach in terms of the time taken to generate the
payoff matrix and solve the matrix game for one stage. The
simulations were performed for methods M-1 and M-2 in
which the payoff matrices have different sizes. The resulting
values shown in Fig. 8 were derived for a grid of size 10×10,
and it is seen that the M-1 method (where the payoff matrix
is of constant dimensions Np × Ne) is clearly advantageous
in terms of computational speed, while resulting in better
performance than the M-2 method (where the payoff matrix
has size N × (N + 1)).
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(a) N = 4, method M-1 (b) N = 4, method M-2 (c) N = 4, method M-3
Fig. 7: Evolution of the pursuit-evasion game. The pursuers are represented in red (with disks to show the capture radius at certain intervals)
and the evader with green square markers. The black dot represents the target state. Note that in cases (a) and (c) the evader reaches the
target without being captured. The players’ markers are artificially enlarged and are not to scale.
Fig. 8: Time taken to solve a single matrix game, with the proposed
Np ×Ne matrix method M-1 in blue, and the N × (N + 1) matrix
method M-2 in pink.
Finally, we also observe that the learning method is sensitive
to the value of the sampling period ∆t relative to the capture
radius `. While the ratio `/(ve∆t) used during training is
maintained constant, the performance of the learning-based
method is consistent. When the ratio is changed, the learning-
based strategy executes a different sequence of moves for the
same initial conditions of the players.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have proposed a systematic way to
compute the evasion strategy for an evader whose goal is to
reach its target destination while avoiding capture by multiple
pursuers at all times. The proposed solution is based on a novel
matrix game formulation of the multi-agent pursuit-evasion
game. The first step of the proposed solution is to generate a
dynamic payoff matrix, whose elements are computed using
a linear combination of the time-to-target and the time-to-
capture. We then refine the matrix formulation by representing
the game in a different state space. The new state space
corresponds to a feature-based representation of the game,
and the discrete actions of the players are also feature-based.
The actions chosen for each player represent the goals of that
player in the game. In the new state space and action space,
we use min-max Q-learning to learn the payoff Q-function for
the zero-sum-game of the evader against the pursuers.
One of the key results of the proposed learning-based matrix
formulation is that it is, in principle, independent of the
number of players, and their specific parameters (e.g., speed
of the pursuers). In terms of performance, the strategy that
uses learning is equally successful as the methods where the
payoffs are constructed using weighted sums. Moreover, using
learning, the evader can perform a combination of evasion
maneuvers that is difficult to explicitly generate otherwise.
However, there are dependencies of the Q-learning solution
on the variables ` and  that are used during training.
We propose that the next step is to use a deep neural network
to develop an improved non-linear approximation of the Q-
function. The structure of the learning algorithm will remain
the same, however, the weight update which is specific to the
linear approximation of the Q-function will be replaced by
the corresponding weight update for a neural network which
is appropriately defined. There are some challenges pertaining
to the use of deep neural nets for Q-learning for this multi-
agent reach-avoid problem, of which two are prominent: (a)
stability concerns of a single net Q-function approximator that
uses bootstrapping, (b) convergence concerns for multi-agent
Q-learning. The former can be addressed by using a double
neural network for Q-learning, and for the latter, we can use
measures such as reward clipping and input scaling. We can
also simplify the problem by embedding the pursuers’ play in
the environment of the evader. Finally, the performance of the
unsupervised learning algorithm (Q-learning in this context)
heavily depends on the reward function associated with each
agent. Reward shaping, particularly for the multi-agent reach-
avoid problem under consideration, is challenging, as it aims
to determine a reward function that guarantees successful
evasion, if such evasion is feasible.
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